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eb of Science has weighted, measured, counted, and aggregated, and … I 
am a 31! What does it mean? According to ResearchGate, I am 34.83 (note 
that illusion of measurement precision) – I got a real boost by acquiring a 
well-connected colleague as a “follower” since followers with high scores impact your 
score. I might also be a 39 or maybe a 91-- Google has its own system of metrics.  
 
What does it mean? It all de-
pends…but on what? There is now a vast 
literature on these impact statistics, cri-
tiques, applications, revisions, alterna-
tives: they are often criticized for their 
“age” bias favoring “old” but it is more 
accurately a “time since degree or time in 
profession” bias; most of the indices as-
sess quantity over quality because cri-
tiques and refutations can contribute to 
high impact scores; they are plagued with 
citation ‘gaps,’ inaccuracies, and distor-
tions; they are affected by publication 
practices such as page limits, citation lim-
its, and publication lags; they reflect peer 
review’s confirmation bias; they can be 
difficult to compare across scientific 
fields due to field-wide practices affect-
ing citation density and recency; the ex-
panding inventory of journals, the emer-
gence of ejournals, pay-to-publish jour-
nals, and “predatory open-access jour-
nals” have introduced new complica-
tions; and most of the statistics suffer 
from various distributional biases since 
they overlook or ignore skew, variability, 
and kutosis. 
But these critiques notwithstanding, 
we have now ratcheted up counting, 
measuring, and weighing, aggregating 
faculty scores into scores for depart-
ments, schools, and universities. These 
inherit all of the flaws of individual-level 
impact statistics and add a few more: the 
weights assigned to variables that are ag-
gregated; the variables themselves and 
whether, which, and how books, grants, 
and academic/scientific honors are 
counted and weighted; the unit’s mix of 
undergraduate, masters, doctoral, and 
assorted professional degrees; the bal-
ance of full-time vs. adjunct faculty, and 
teaching vs. research faculty; limitations 
on the available data for interdisciplinary 
or multidisciplinary programs; and the 
lack of relevant outcome measures to 
gauge the actual “impact” of research 
and graduates. 
Access to the “gold standard” of 
“Academic Analytics” is limited by a 
number of confidentiality agreements but 
The Chronicle of Higher Education (2007) 
did once offer a peak at some of its data. 
I looked at psychology programs. Well, 
first I looked at the “general psychology” 
classification – Stanford is on top, but 
note only 7 faculty members contributed 
and the department website lists 32. But 
there’s also a “various psychology” clas-
sification – IU leads that list. And there’s 
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a “clinical psychology” list – here KU 
shows up with 30 clinical faculty so I 
guess they were considering me to be 
clinical. And then there’s also a “cogni-
tive science” list where IU shows up 
again, now with 56 faculty members.  
So what does it mean for a program 
to be 1.36 or a 2.06? Well, I constructed a 
box and whisker plot, leaving aside the 
cognitive science data. And here we are: 
KU falls just outside the box defined by 
the interquartile range, bearing in mind 
all of these programs were at least 1 SD 
above the overall mean for all programs 
assessed.  
What does it mean? The great prom-
ise of analytics is that benchmarking – 
faculty members, departments, universi-
ties, - will lead to wise strategic decision-
making. My question is “what does it 
mean” to see “every variable in each aca-
demic discipline …[and] national quar-
tile, quintile, decile, and vigintile sum-
maries..” (Academic Analytics, 2013)?”  
Wolfram Alpha (2013) trolls lots of 
electronic data and lets one compare, 
well, nearly anything and everyone in-
cluding universities. So here’s a compari-
son of KU and MU using Wikipedia hits 
per day. What does it mean? The answer 
probably has something to do with foot-
ball and basketball but that’s just my 
guess, in this case derived from the sea-
sonal periodicity of the spikes. That is, 
given a theory of what determines Wik-
ipedia hits, it tested that theory against 
this data by, e.g., looking at win/loss rec-
ords in football and basketball.  
Wolfram himself published detailed 
visualizations of his email history (Wolf-
ram, 2012). What do they mean? In his 
cases, it seems obvious: When he is sleep-
ing, he is not emailing – and his email vs. 
sleep cycle was affected by a 2009 trip to 
Europe! And his use of email is increas-
ing. But I would argue that these data and 
the graphic displays of this data itself 
provide few insights into Wolfram’s per-
sonal history. Surely he knew he was un-
likely to be sending emails in the middle 
of the night; surely he knew he was send-
ing more and more emails every day? 
The graphs provide a visual confirmation 
and don’t seem to themselves to trigger 
new insights. 
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Indeed, Wolfram produced a distri-
bution of the number of emails per day 
only to conclude “What is this distribu-
tion? Is there a simple model of it? I don’t 
know. Wolfram Alpha Pro tells us that 
the best fit it finds is to a geometric distri-
bution. But it officially rejects that fit. 
Still, at least the tail seems – as so often – 
to follow a power law. And perhaps 
that’s telling me something about myself 
though I have to say I don’t know what.” 
(Wolfram, 2012).  
Perhaps that is because appropriate 
benchmarks are lacking – would greater 
insight into Wolfram’s life be provided 
by knowing where he stacks up in terms 
of “quartiles, quintiles, deciles, and 
vigintiles” of all email users? Probably 
not. The real challenge is to move beyond 
descriptive analytics. Even comparative 
analytics don’t really answer the right 
questions. In Wolfram’s case, the visuali-
zations at any level of aggregation don’t 
suggest how he might more effectively 
manage his email correspondence, 
whether the volume of email is nega-
tively (or positively) impacting his 
productivity, or even affecting his sleep 
cycles. This data might provide a baseline 
against which to compare interventions 
but the data themselves do not tell him 
whether or how to intervene. 
What does it mean? Suppose it is an 
ex-Gaussian distribution? Ex-Gaussian 
distributions result from a convolution of 
a normal distribution and an exponential 
function. They can be modeled as 3 pa-
rameters: one for the mean (mu) (the 
peak), one for the standard deviation 
(sigma) (the variability or spread), and an 
exponential (tau) (for the tail). Ratcliff 
(1979) has mapped these 3 parameters 
onto specific cognitive processes that de-
termine the speed (but not accuracy) of 
decision making and he and others have 
investigated lifespan developmental dif-
ferences in decision making: children 
tend to more variable, affecting the sigma 
parameter, than young adults, older adults 
tend to be slower (mu), more variable 
(sigma), and more extreme (tau).  
So if Wolfram’s email distribution is 
an ex-Gaussian, what interpretation 
might we attach to these 3 parameters, 
mu, sigma, tau? Would knowing his aver-
age daily burden of emails (mu), the vari-
ability of his email traffic (sigma), or its 
extremes (tau) affect strategic invest-
ments in, e.g., network speed? My point 
is not that the data and its visualization 
are irrelevant but that they must be cou-
pled with an explanatory theory –of reac-
tion times, of emailing, or of faculty 
productivity. 
Knowing how individual faculty 
members, departments, or universities 
stack up on various metrics – those 
“quartile, quintile, decile, and vigintile” 
comparisons - doesn’t really provide an-
swers to how productivity can be en-
hanced or sustained. And I think we are 
distracted by the logistics of compiling all 
this data and generating the fancy 
graphics, apps, visualizations.  
What does it mean? One guy who 
does seem to be able to answer this ques-
tion is Ed Tufte. Tufte is an emeritus pro-
fessor of political science from Yale who 
founded his own publishing company to 
produce a series of books on graphical 
design and analysis. Along with others 
like Stephen Few, Nigel Holmes, and Na-
than Yan, he has created a new discipline 
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of data visualization. Tufte’s scathing cri-
tique of PowerPoint (Tufte, 2003) should 
be mandatory; its low resolution leads to 
over-generalizations, imprecise state-
ments, slogans, lightweight evidence, 
and thinly-argued claims; bullet outlines 
make us stupid by omitting critical rela-
tionships in favor of a 1-dimensional or-
dering; and the reliance on projected 
slides reduces information transmission 
to a few words, lots of “phluff” – white 
space, cartoons, bullets, frames, data-thin 
graphics.  
Tufte coined the term ‘chartjunk.’ He 
has also suggested some general princi-
ples of data visualization (Tufte, 2001). 
Tufte has provided few general princi-
ples: avoid chart junk, maximize the data 
ink to total ink ratio, and employ small 
multiples. Tufte offers other principles 
for informativeness by creating multiple 
layers of information. Tufte is known for 
2 types of graphics he introduced. Both 
exemplify his principle of maximizing 
data-ink. One graphic Tufte developed is 
the slopegraph – Tufte’s riff on scatter 
plots – to relate to scalar variables.  
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I constructed a slopegraph using the 
Chronicle FSPI data. Although the Index is 
supposed to be normalized for faculty 
size, we can clearly see that the overall 
trend is for larger departments to have 
somewhat more productive faculty – sug-
gesting size confers some “synergies” 
perhaps by distributing administrative 
duties more widely. The slopegraph re-
veals 2 patterns embedded in the overall 
pattern: a cluster of programs showing 
diminishing returns with increasing fac-
ulty size and a cluster that seems to indi-
cate “smaller IS better.” So the challenge 
would be to understand whether there is 
a critical or optimal size for an adminis-
trative unit- one that promotes produc-
tivity of individual faculty. 
The other Tufte graphic is the 
sparkline. A sparkline is a simple trace of 
one variable against a second, usually on 
a scale like time. I also constructed a 
sparkgraph for my colleagues in Psychol-
ogy – plotting Web of Science impact 
scores over time since degree. It reveals 3 
clusters or cohorts, defined by their im-
pact scores. My hope is that this sparkline 
might spark some ideas about the factors 
that contribute to these 3 clusters. In my 
2010 Merrill talk, I pointed out that 
highly productive faculty tend to peak 
early in their careers and to sustain that 
level of peak performance throughout 
their career, even careers that span 30 or 
more years. I think we can identify a 
number of factors that contribute to early 
career peaks, factors that favored my co-
hort and disadvantaged those from ear-
lier and later cohorts: a higher level of 
state support and annual merit salary in-
creases that rewarded research produc-
tivity; an expanding university, one cre-
ating many new interdisciplinary pro-
grams built around research areas; 
smaller class sizes, more GTA support, 
and fewer “ancillary” obligations such as 
building and maintaining websites, su-
pervising students engaged in service 
learning, and devising ways to incubate 
and transfer technologies.  
At the 2001 Merrill Retreat on “eval-
uating research productivity,” I turned to 
some sage advice from 1897: Cajal (1999) 
recognized 6 impediments to faculty 
productivity – what he termed “diseases 
of the will:” the dilettantes or contempla-
tors; the erudite or bibliophiles; the in-
strument addicts; the megalomaniacs; the 
misfits; and the theory builders (p. 75).” 
He is most dismissive of the contempla-
tors as “likeable for their juvenile enthu-
siasm and piquant and winning speech as 
they are ineffective in making any real 
scientific progress” (p. 77) and he recog-
nizes that “cold-hearted instrumental ad-
dicts cannot make themselves useful“(p. 
82) and he labeled the misfits, who oc-
cupy a professorship “simply to collect 
impact / date of degree
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the salary, and to enjoy the incidental 
pleasure of excluding the competent” (p. 
82-83), as “hopelessly ill” (p. 82). For the 
rest, Cajal has some recommendations re-
garding promoting research productivity 
that ring as true today as they did in 1897 
or in 2001. Cajal reminds the bibliophile 
that “We render a tribute of respect to 
those who add original work to a library, 
and withhold it from those who carry a 
library around in their head” (p. 78). He 
advices the megalomaniac to “tackle 
small problems first …[an approach 
which] may not always lead to fame but 
[to] the esteem of the learned and the re-
spect and consideration of our col-
leagues” (p. 80). He notes that rather than 
bemoaning the lack of able assistants, or 
laboratory equipment, or government 
funding, that “dreamers do not work 
hard enough” (p. 80). And he reminds the 
theorist that “Theories desert us, while 
data defend us” (p. 86).  
Cajal cautions that independent 
judgment, intellectual curiosity, perse-
verance, and concentration the keys to 
productivity. Beyond these prerequisites, 
Cajal emphasizes that research produc-
tivity results from a “passion for reputa-
tion, for approval and applause,” and a 
“taste for originality, the gratification as-
sociated with the act of discovery itself”. 
These are the real determinates of faculty 
productivity. Analytics, no matter how 
aesthetically plotted as “quartile, quin-
tile, decile, and vigintile summaries” do 
not assess this “passion for reputation” 
and this “taste for originality.” That’s 
what it means – to be productive, to have 
an impact. 
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